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Abstract
This dissertation generalized the base-rate fallacy in diagnostic decision-making to the
field of school psychology. This fallacy involves allowing information other than prior
probabilities inappropriately to dominate probability judgments .

Participants included

80 school psychologists who were asked to rate the probability of a learning-disability
diagnosis and to state their degree of confidence in that diagnosis. In Study I,
participants received only base-rate information.

In Study 11,participants received

either (a) relevant base-rate information plus irrelevant individuating information,
(b) relevant base-rate information plus relevant diagnostic information, or (c)
relevant base-rate information plus relevant diagnostic information plus irrelevant
individuating information. Additionally, in Study II these three levels of information
were completely crossed with a second independent variable, that is, salient link. Here,
base-rate information was either linked or not linked with the diagnosis to be predicted.
Results showed that (a) school psychologists appropriately used relevant base-rate
information only when no other information was available, (b) when a salient link
between relevant base-rate information and the diagnosis to be predicted was provided,
diagnostic accuracy did not change, (c) when relevant diagnostic and irrelevant
individuating information were provided in addition to base-rate information, diagnostic
accuracy decreased relative to base-rate-only information, and (d) school psychologists
were least confident of diagnoses for which they demonstrated most accuracy. Results
were discussed in terms of implications for diagnostic decision making in the field of
school psychology.
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Introduction
This dissertation examines the use of base rates by school psychologists in a
diagnostic decision-making task. Current knowledge of diagnostic decision-making in
school psychology is important because if suboptimal reasoning is used to make decisions
about children and youth with disabilities, it is likely that many students will be
misclassified. For example, children in need of special education and related services
may not be identified, whereas those who do not need such services may be labeled as
disabled. Children mislabeled as in need of services may then suffer social and emotional
consequences. Fagley (1988) has called for research that examines whether school
psychologists are prone to the same decision-making errors (i.e., underutilization or
neglect of base rates) as has been documented in other fields (see Eddy, 1982; Schwartz,
Gory, Kassirer, & Essig, 1973).
The present study was designed to investigate psychoeducational decision-making
with respect to the processing of base-rate information and to examine conditions that
may increase diagnostic decision-making accuracy. Base rates refer to the frequency of
an event or diagnosis and are integral to diagnostic decision-making. Bayes theorem
provides an explicit model of how to incorporate base-rate information into the
decision-making process; however, research in the area of decision-making has
documented that both clinicians and laypeople are subject to a systematic and predictable
decision-making error, that is, the "base-rate fallacy" (Bar-Hillel & Fisch hoff, 1981;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Lyon & Slovic; 1976). This fallacy involves allowing
information other than base rates to dominate when making probability judgments.
Thus, base-rate information often is overlooked even though it is essential to
probabilistic

decision-making.

In the following section, several areas of literature are reviewed that provide the
theoretical underpinnings for this study. These include: (a) the research within
cognitive psychology that examines the cognitive processes of human judgment and
1

decision making, (b) the cognitive domain of social psychology that examines the
structure and use of knowledge and judgment rules, and (c) the research on base rates
that documents their role in decision-making and the effects of their neglect.

Researchin CognitivePsychology
Research in human judgment and decision-making has several points of origin.
Cognitive psychology's focus on human judgment and decision-making stemmed from
research conducted in the 1940s and 1950s. This research, which compared
statistically derived judgment models, or actuarial models, to the clinical decisionmaking processes of the human judge, revealed that the actuarial approaches
outperformed the clinical approaches (Meehl, 1954). Subsequently, cognitive
psychologists began to focus on understanding the cognitive processes of the human judge.
The information-processing approach within cognitive psychology used the
computer to model the hidden decision-making strategies of the human judge. One of the
main tenets of information-processing theory is that the human information-processing
system is limited due to a focused window of attention, as well as a limited short-term
memory capacity (Miller, 1956). These cognitive limitations have obvious
implications for decision making.
Kahneman and Tversky (1973), in their seminal work, identified decisionmaking errors characteristic of human judges due to the limitations of the human
information-processing system. They studied the coding and combining of information
by human judges in probabilistic decision-making tasks. Their research consistently
documented a discrepancy between judges actual performance and optimal performance.
This suboptimal performance has been attributed to the use of cognitive heuristics or
judgment rules that reduce complex tasks, such as assessing probabilities and predicting
values, to simpler judgmental operations.
These heuristics are considered to be an important feature of our cognitive
systems because of the limitations of human information processing (Tversky &
2

Kahneman, 1974) and because of the complexity and the variety of decisions we make
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). It has been documented, however, that the same processes and
tools that can simplify a problem, when overapplied, also can lead to systematic and
predictable errors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
Thus, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) focused on gaining a better understanding
of human information processing by examining: (a) the cognitive heuristics used to
reduce complex decision-making tasks, and (b) the kinds of errors that are made
through the use of these heuristics. They explained the justification for this research
strategy:
There are three related reasons for the focus on systematic errors
and inferential biases in the study of reasoning. First, they expose
some of our intellectual limitations and suggest ways to improve the
quality of our thinking. Second, errors and biases often reveal the
psychological processes .that govern judgment and inference. Third,
mistakes and fallacies help the mapping of human intuitions by
indicating which principles of statistics or logic are non-intuitive or
counter-intuitive. (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; p.124).
Heuristics.

There are three main cognitive heuristics that can lead to systematic

decision-making errors in prediction, in part, because they are not sensitive to baserate information.

First, the representative heuristic refers to a decision-making

strategy that relies on making a decision or prediction based on similarity.

For

example, research examining the representativeness heuristic has determined that
people assess probabilities by .the degree to which the item to be predicted is similar or
representative of their conception of a category (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). One of
the main problems with making probability judgments by representativeness is the
neglect of prior probabilities, or base rates. Base rates have no effect on the
representative heuristic, even though they should play a major role in assessing
probabilities.
In other situations, people make probability judgments based on the availability
or ease with which the category to be predicted can be brought to mind. The availability
heuristic can be a useful tool for assessing probability because in many cases larger
3

classes of events are retrieved more quickly; however, availability also is influenced by
other factors that have no bearing on the probability of occurrence. Specifically,
availability can be influenced by familiarity, salience, the effectiveness of a search set,
illusory correlation, and imaginability (Tversky & Kahn-eman, 1974). The influence of
these factors leads to neglect of the base rates, and thus to errors in probability
judgments .
Anchoring and adjustment, the third heuristic , rely on making probability
judgments by starting from an initial value (anchor) and adjusting that value to reach a
final estimate. This strategy of anchoring and adjustment has been demonstrated to
result in predictable errors in which people insufficiently adjust their estimates by
anchoring on the initial value ( Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring can result
when an initial starting value is provided or when an incomplete computation is made of
the available data (e.g., failure to incorporate base-rate information) .
Summary.

In summary, the research within cognitive psychology has attempted

to clarify the underlying cognitive processes of the human judge.

The results of this

research have documented the limitations of our information-processing systems and the
resultant suboptimal reasoning strategies. Cognitive heuristics are a means by which
we simplify complex problems, such as assessing probabilities . . These heuristics,
however, can lead to serious judgment errors, in part, because they neglect base-rate
information. Thus, one of the most important approaches used in studying judgment and
decision making has been to analyze the systematic discrepancies between normative
judgment models and actual judgments.
Research io Social Psychology
A cognitive approach to the study of human judgment within social psychology,
which closely paralleled the study of human judgment within cognitive psychology, began
to gain attention in the 1960s. This cognitive orientation stemmed from research such
as Tajfel's (1969) "Cognitive

Aspects
of Prejudice" that applied a cognitive perspective
4

to the understanding of human behavior. In the early 1970s, the longstanding attitude-behavior link primarily used to explain human judgment was criticized, and a new
emphasis was placed on the information-processing limitations, not the motivations, of
the human judge (Israel & Tajfel, 1972). Further, the use of the computer to model
human judgment was de-emphasized within cognitive psychology; instead, understanding
the limitations of human judgment was stressed.

Schemas.Researchers in social psychology, as well as in cognitive psychology,
emphasized the role of schemas in aiding human judgment and information processing.
Schemas are cognitive structures that are formed by past experiences that help us to
organize and to understand information (Neisser, 1976). They provide meaning and
organization to new events and objects, and help to direct our attention to relevant
features of the environment. Thus, they provide a structure by which new material can
be integrated with memories that have been stored. Based on this role, schemas can aid
us in inferring and predicting what will happen.
Schemas, like heuristics, however, can lead to biases and errors in judgment.
These errors can occur when we miscategorize information or we oversimplify our
processing of information. For example, our schemata can sometimes misdirect our
attention and, thus, we ignore relevant information. We also can make errors by
remembering schema-related details that did not actually occur (Schneider, 1988).
Heuristics also may guide the selection of schemas and, thus, inappropriate schemas may
be activated (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Further, it has been suggested that humans lack
good schemata for dealing with probabilistic data. It appears that although the logical
importance of base rates cannot be overstated, this kind of information fails to be
effective in activating appropriate schemas.
Stereotypes can be thought of as schema-like concepts in that they guide us in
encoding, retaining, and retrieving information in the social world. Hamilton and Rose
(1980) suggested that we can understand stereotypes better by framing them as
5

correlational concepts.

For example, the stereotype that women are bad drivers, is

based on a perceived relationship between an identified group, that is, women, and some
trait, that is, bad driving. If we examine how people form concepts and beliefs based on
the covariation between two variables, we may understand stereotypes better .
Covarjatjon analysjs. The cognitive demands involved in accurately assessing
covariation make us prone both to the development and maintenance of stereotypes
(Hamilton & Rose, 1980).

Determining when two (or more) variables truly are

related, that is, covariation analysis, is a difficult cognitive task.

In order to establish

that a relationship exists between two variables, in this case a particular group and
some trait, one must show that the trait occurs more frequently among that group than
among other groups.

Individuals have great difficulty analyzing covariation and thus

commonly draw false conclusions about relationships between two variables (Arkes &
Harkness, 1980; Gnys, Willis, & Faust, in press; Smedslund, 1963; Ward & Jenkins,
1965).
With respect to diagnostic decision making, this error occurs when decision
makers consider only the frequency with which the sign is present and the disorder
present, and fail to consider other situations in which (a) the sign is present but the
condition absent, (b) the sign is absent but the condition is present, and (c) the sign is
absent and the condition is absent.

Failure to consider all of this information makes it

impossible to determine whether a valid relationship exists between the sign and the
condition.
These false associations between variables have been referred to as illusory
correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1967). The disregard of base rates is one of the
main contributing factors to the formation of illusory correlations.

Here, the

psychologist comes to believe that particular features of test performance provide
trustworthy indicators of certain diagnostic categories, without attending to the base
rates (Chapman & Chapman, 1967).

For example, one commonly reported relationship
6

interpreted from the Draw-a-Person Test is that highly detailed drawings of eyes are
associated with paranoia. Although research has failed to validate this (and many other
sign-diagnosis relationships) on the Draw-a-Person Test, clinicians still often agree
about such clinical correlates of Draw-a-Person performance (Ziskin & Faust, 1991 ).

Conclusions
fromCognitiveandSocialPsychology
This section has highlighted the research in both cognitive and social psychology
on human judgment and decision-making. Research has revealed some of the limitations
of the human judge, and the cognitive strategies and rules used to compensate for these
limitations.

For example, cognitive heuristics and schemas facilitate processing of

complex data. These decision aids, however, can lead to systematic errors, especially
when dealing with probabilistic data, in part because they neglect base-rate
information. The neglect of base rates has been implicated in diagnostic decision-making
errors, as well as in errors of judgment in the social world. For example, stereotypes
can be thought of as illusory correlations that develop and are maintained, in part, due to
a neglect of base-rate information. In the following section, base rates and their role in
diagnostic prediction are reviewed and the potential implications of the base-rate fallacy
for the field of school psychology are discussed.

BaseRates
Base rates, as stated previously, refer to the frequency with which an event (i.e.,
a symptom or condition) occurs. For example, if school phobia exists in"1 out of 100
junior high-school students, the base rate for school phobia in that population is 1%.
Thus, base rates refer to the prevalence of a characteristic in a population.
One of the problems associated with the neglect of base-rate information, as
discussed in the section on formation of stereotypes, is that a clinician may not know
whether a sign is validly related to a condition. Knowledge of whether a sign is validly
related to a condition, however, is not enough to determine whether use of that sign will
be helpful in diagnostic prediction (Faust & Nurcombe, 1989). The clinician still needs
7

to know the base rate or frequency of the condition in the population. If one lacks
knowledge of the base rate of the condition, then it is impossible to determine the
diagnostic utility of the sign, that is, whether more erroneous classifications will be
made when using the sign.

The validity of diagnostic or predictive signs is never

absolute or constant, but must be interpreted in relation to the prior odds or the base
rates (Meehl & Rosen, 1955). Disorders that occur less frequently require a more
accurate sign if more correct than false identifications are to be made. If use of a sign
does not improve the accuracy one would achieve by relying on the base rates alone, then
overall accuracy will be decreased by relying on the sign (Faust & Nurcombe, 1989).
The following example is adapted from Faust and Nurcombe (1989). Suppose
that the prevalence of school phobia is 1 out of 1000 cases. School psychologist A relies
on the base rates and consistently says that the condition is not present. School
psychologist B only diagnoses the condition when there is overwhelming evidence.
Further, suppose that school psychologist B never misses a true case of school phobia,
and only 1 out of 100 times, says the condition is present when it is not. On a sample of
1000 cases, school psychologist A will make one error, that is, will miss one case of
school phobia when it is present. School psychologist B, on the other hand, will make
approximately ten errors, that is, will detect the one case of school phobia, but also will
misidentify nearly ten children (i.e., almost 1 of 100).
Thus, base rates are integral to diagnostic decision making both to determine: (a)
whether a sign is validly related to a condition and, further, (b) whether use of that sign
will increase diagnostic accuracy. As Faust and Nurcombe (1989) suggested, however,
base rates should not be the sole criteria by which we guide our practice. Diagnostic
decision making should be framed as a analysis of the kinds of errors we are willing to
make (e.g., the consequences of overdiagnosing a condition versus missing a condition).
In some situations, missing a condition may have relatively minor consequences; in
other circumstances, missing a condition can have life threatening consequences.
8

!gnorjng base rates. Research examining base rates in probabilistic decision
making tasks has typically pitted base-rate information against some kind of
individuating or diagnostic information (e.g., a personality description or the correct
positive rate and false-alarm rate of a test) (Arkes, 1989). A consistent finding of this
research is that individuals presented with base-rate information and case-specific, or
individuating information, will defer to the individuating information (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973).

For example, in their seminal work, Kahneman and Tversky (1973)

presented participants with base-rate information (e.g., percentage of people employed
as lawyers versus engineers), and individuating information (e.g., a brief personality
description). The personality description was designed to be non-diagnostic in
differentiating lawyers from engineers. Participants were asked to make a probability
judgment (on a scale of 0 to 100) as to whether the person was an engineer or a lawyer.
Results of their study demonstrated that participants relied on the stereotypic
description and ignored the base-rate data. Participants did use base-rate data when no
other information was presented.
A similar finding was documented by Borgida and Nisbett (1977). In their
study, participants were presented with base-rate information in the form of mean
course ratings, and individuating information in the form of former students'
descriptions of the course. Again, participants relied on the individuating information
for course selection and neglected the base rates or mean course ratings.
Probability judgments also can be dominated by an accuracy effect (i.e.,
anchoring_on the diagnosticity of specific information) (Lyon & Slavic, 1975). Tversky
and Kahneman (1980) conducted a study in which participants were presented with a
scenario and asked to make a probability judgment. They were told that 85% of the cabs
in the city are blue and 15% are green. A cab has been involved in an accident and a
witness has identified the cab as green. The witness was accurate in identifying each
color 80% of the time and confused colors 20% of the time. Participants were asked to
9

estimate the probability that the cab involved the accident was green as the witness had
stated.

In this Bayesian-inference problem, all normatively relevant information (i.e.,

base rates, correct positive rate, and false positive rate) was supplied.
Bayes rule provides a normative formula for this decision:
Pj

= Pp1 /

(Pp1 + Op2)

(1)

Here, Pj is the probability that the cab is green; P is the base rate of green cabs in the
city, p1 is the valid positive identification rate, Q is the base rate of blue cabs in the
city, and P2 is the false positive identification rate. Applying Equation 1 to the previous
example, the correct probability judgment is 41%, that is, .41 = (.15 x .80) I [(.15 x
.80) + (.85 x .20)].

Instead, participants tended to anchor on the hit-rate information

without integrating pertinent base-rate information, and made estimates of 80%.
Studies have been conducted examining the stability of the base-rate fallacy
(Bar-Hillel, 1975; Lyon & Slovic, 1976).

For example, variations of one · of Tversky

and Kahneman's original base-rate problems were presented to 350 participants. Some
of the variables manipulated included order of information presentation, varying the
extremity of the base rates (i.e., 90% versus 60%), and using a verbal description
instead of actual statistics for the base-rate data (i.e., using words such as most instead
of actual numbers). Results of this research consistently demonstrated that when other
information was present, the base-rate information was neglected. Thus, the base-rate
fallacy is considered to be a robust phenomenon (Ajzen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Lyon
& Slovic, 1976; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975).

Causality.In an attempt to encourage people to use base-rate information,
cognitive · psychologists have attempted a variety of interventions (Arkes, 1989).
One approach has been to enhance the causal link between the base-rate information and
the category to be predicted. Nisbett and Ross (1980) concluded that individuals may
lack an intuitive understanding of Bayesian statistics, but their judgments would be
much less impaired if base rates could be made more salient. Situations in which base
10

rates appear more salient include conditions where no other information is presented or
where the base rate has a causal interpretation.
Studies have manipulated causal relevance and demonstrated that base rates may
dominate probability judgments in particular conditions (Ajzen, 1977).

For example,

in a study conducted by Ajzen, some participants were given a brief description of a
student, Gary. Participants then were asked to make a probability judgment as to
whether Gary passed or failed an exam. The first group of participants was told that
Gary had been randomly sampled from a group of students, among which 75% had failed
the exam and 25% had passed the exam. These participants ignored the normative
relevance of the base rates in favor of the individuating information. Another group of
participants, however, was told that the test was failed by 75% of the people in Gary's
class and passed by 25% of the people in Gary's class. These individuals did attend to the
high base rate of failures (i.e., 75%) and did not defer to the individuating information.
Thus, Ajzen concluded that base rates that are causally linked to the event or target to be
predicted may influence probability judgments.
Bar-Hillel (1980) discussed the relationship of causality to relevance ,
proffering that causality is only one aspect of relevance. She suggested that individuals
may ignore base-rate information because they think it is irrelevant.

Moreover, she

stated that if the relevance of base-rate information is enhanced, individuals may be
more likely to use this information. Results of her study indicated that two items of
information may be used only if they appear equally relevant. Thus, one way relevance
can be manipulated is by providing a causal link between the base-rate data and the
outcome to be predicted. In this way, the base rate is interpreted as having some causal
relation to the outcome to be predicted.

Research
auestjons
This dissertation was an investigation of whether the base-rate fallacy
generalized to the field of school psychology. Further, conditions were varied to
11

determine whether there are conditions favorable to the use of base-rate information.
Specifically, this study examined the effects of illusory-correlation information,
accuracy-rate information, and salience of link, on the use of base-rate information. To
clarify terminology, accuracy-rate information has been referred to in the research
literature as diagnostic or true-positive rate information, illusory correlation has been
referred to as individuating information or a belief in a relationship that does not exist,
and salience of link has been referred to as relevance or causality.
In this study, the illusory-correlation was related to the diagnosis of a learning
disability.

The illusory-correlation information was included to elucidate how this kind

of information, in combination with base-rate information and accuracy-rate
information affects diagnostic accuracy. This is considered to be an important area of
investigation as research has demonstrated that school psychologists are prone to the
phenomenon of illusory correlation.
The choice of the illusory correlation was based on research (Gnys et al., in
press) that has documented that some school psychologists believe in a systematic
relationship between levels of intersubtest scatter on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale
for Children--Revised (WISC-R) and the diagnosis of learning disabilities, although
research has failed to validate this relationship (Kaufman, 1979). Moreover, research
has documented that normal children show a mean range of seven (fil2. = 2) scaled points
on the WISC-R (Kaufman, 1976). Thus, a scaled-score difference as large as nine
points is unremarkable (Reynolds & Kaufman, 1990). These findings document that
intersubtest scatter has negligible predictive value in the diagnosis of learning
disabilities.

Further, warnings have been advanced (Kaufman, 1976) that levels of

scatter that frequently occur in the normal population should not influence diagnostic
decisions.
The diagnostic information provided the accuracy rate of the test (i.e., the
percentage of children diagnosed as learning disabled who are learning disabled) and the

12

false-positive rate (the number of children identified as learning disabled who are not
learning disabled).

In conditions where accuracy-rate information was presented, all

the normatively relevant information necessary to make a Bayesian calculation was
presented. Finally, salience of link was explored to examine whether providing a link
between the base-rate information and the category to be predicted would increase
diagnostic accuracy. These variables were manipulated systematically to provide
directions for future intervention considerations.
In conclusion, this dissertation addressed the following questions:
1. Do school psychologists use base-rate information? It was predicted that
school psychologists would use base-rate data when no other information was presented.
2. Does providing a salient link between the base rate and the category to be
predicted increase accuracy? It was predicted that school psychologists' probability
judgments would be more accurate when there was a salient link between the base rateinformation and the category to be predicted.
3. Does the kind of information presented with the base-rate information affect
accuracy? It was predicted that school psychologists would be less accurate when
presented with base-rate information plus illusory-correlation

information plus

accuracy-rate information versus when presented with either (a) base-rate
information plus accuracy-rate information or (b) base-rate information plus
illusory-correlation

information ..

The first prediction was based on research showing that when base-rate
information is presented alone, both lay people and professionals use that information
appropriately when making probability judgments (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).
The second prediction was based on limited research showing that when a salient link
between the base-rate information and the category to be predicted is provided,
judgmental accuracy improves (Ajzen, 1977). Finally, the third prediction was based
on two areas of research showing that judgmental accuracy decreased when base-rate
13

information was combined either (a) with relevant diagnostic information (e.g., Lyon &
Slovic, 1975) or (b) with irrelevant individuating information (e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky, 1973). Thus, it was predicted that lower levels of judgmental accuracy would
result when base-rate information is combined with both relevant diagnostic
information and irrelevant individuating information, than when base-rate information
is combined with either of these other sources of information alone.

14

Method
Study I
Subjects. A preliminary, descriptive study was conducted to determine if school
psychologists would, indeed, use base-rate information when no other information was
provided. Information packets were mailed to a random sample of 60 school
psychologists (practitioners and trainers) selected from the Directory of Nationally
Certified School Psychologists (NASP, 1991). Psychologists who did not respond within
four weeks were sent a second mailing. All participants were guaranteed anonymity and
were treated in accordance with ethical standards adopted by the American Psychological
Association (APA, 1981) and by the University of Rhode Island Institutional Review
Board (1992) .
Materials and procedure. All psychologists received a cover letter that explained
the purpose of the survey and guaranteed their anonymity. A copy of this letter appears
in Appendix A. The information packet comprised two parts. In the first section,
respondents indicated: (a) highest academic degree, (b) year of degree, (c) gender, (d)
geographic location, and (e) primary professional role (e.g., practitioner , trainer).

In

the second section, the packet included a case scenario providing base-rate information,
specifically the percentage of boys diagnosed as learning disabled in a school (i.e., 10%).
The case scenario used in Study I appears in Appendix B.
Respondents first filled out the demographic information on the questionnaire.
They then were asked to rate the probability that the child described by the case scenario
was learning disabled on a scale from ·0% (lowest--not probable at all) to 100%
(highest--certain). They also were asked to rate their confidence in their decision on a
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not confident) to 7 (very confident) . Respondents'
probability ratings were used to calculate an accuracy score. This score represented the
absolute difference between the participant's stated probability rating and the correct
rating of 10%. Thus, lower difference scores represented higher accuracy.
15

Study11
Subjects.Information packages were mailed to a random sample of 300 school
psychologists (practitioners and trainers) selected from the Directory of Nationally
Certified School Psychologists (NASP, 1991). Student affiliates were excluded from the
sample. Psychologists who did not respond within approximately four weeks received a
second mailing in order to obtain at least 20 completed surveys in each condition.

Materialsand procedure.All psychologists received a cover letter that explained
the purpose of the survey and guaranteed their anonymity (see Appendix A). Materials
consisted of six different information packets, each comprising two parts. Similar to
Study I, in the first section, respondents indicated: (a) highest academic degree, (b)
year of degree, (c) gender, (d) geographic location, and (e) primary professional role
(e.g., practitioner,

trainer).

The second section contained case-scenario information. Three kinds of
information were provided in varying combinations.

This included (a) base-rate

information; (b) irrelevant, individuating information designed to assess susceptibility
to illusory correlation; and (c) relevant, diagnostic accuracy -rate information.

Every

packet included base-rate information, specifically the percentage of boys diagnosed as
learning disabled in a school (i.e., 10%). Two-thirds of the packets contained the
irrelevant information. This was provided by including the summary page of the
response booklet from the WISC-R. This summary page showed a range of intersubtest
scatter of 9 scaled-score points. This range was chosen because of its fairly common
occurrence and its lack of diagnostic utility (Kaufman, 1979; McDermott , Gluttin,
Jones, Watkins, & Kush, 1989; Reynolds & Kaufman, 1989). All IQ scores were within
the average range (Verbal IQ

=

97, Performance IQ

=

104, and Full Scale IQ

=

100).

Two-thirds of the packets included the relevant accuracy-rate information pertaining to
a procedure used to diagnose learning disabilities. This included the true-positive rate
of the procedure (i.e., 80%) and the false-positive rate (i.e., 20%). Case scenarios
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such as these have been used in research examining clinical decision making and have
been demonstrated to be highly correlated with actual cases (Kiriwan, Chaput de
Saintonge, Joyce, & Currey, 1983).
Finally, in addition to the case-scenario information, half of the packets
contained a statement clearly linking the base-rate information with the diagnosis to be
predicted (i.e., "Because of an effective early-intervention program in John Smith's
school, the incidence of learning disabilities among boys in this school is only 10%."),
whereas the other half did not contain this statement. The case scenarios used in Study II
appear in Appendix C.
Respondents first filled out the demographic information on the questionnaire.
They then were asked to rate the probability that the child represented by the casescenario information was learning disabled on a scale from 0% (lowest--not probable at
all) to 100% (highest--certain).

They also were asked to rate their confidence in their

decision on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not confident) to 7 (very confident).

Design.Each participating school psychologist was assigned randomly to one of
six conditions created by varying the levels of two independent variables. One
independent variable, salience of link (i.e., provision of a link between the base rate
0

data and the category to be predicted), comprised two levels: (a) salient link between the
base-rate data and category to be predicted and (b) no link provided between the baserate data and category to be predicted. The other independent variable, information,
comprised three levels: (a) base-rate information plus relevant, that is, accuracyrate, information (BR + AR), (b) base-rate information plus irrelevant, that . is,
illusory-correlation,

information (BR + IC), and (c) base-rate information plus

accuracy-rate information plus illusory-correlation

information (BR + AR + IC).

The levels of these variables were completely crossed, resulting in a two-bythree between-groups design. Specifically, one group received a case scenario defined
by BR + AR information with no link, one by BR + AR information with a salient link,
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one by BR + IC with no link, one by BR + IC with a salient link, one by BR + AR + IC
with no link, and one by BR + AR + IC with a salient link.
Similar to Study I, the dependent variables were (a) a diagnostic accuracy
rating, and (b) a confidence rating in the diagnosis. Accuracy ratings were derived by
calculating the absolute difference between the participant's stated probability judgment
and the correct value for the materials received. The correct value for the BR + IC
condition was 10% (the base rate), whereas the correct value for the BR + AC and the
BR + AR + IC conditions (as calculated from Equation 1) was 31 %.
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Results

AnalysisI
Of the 60 surveys mailed for Study I, 13 were returned, and upon a remailing of
the remaining 47, 9 were returned.

This yielded a final response rate of 37%. Two

surveys were deleted randomly in order to obtain 20 surveys for the group . The sample
characteristics for Study I are presented in Table 1.
Table 1

SampleCharacteristics
for StudyI

n

Characteristic

%

Educational
Level
Master's

3

15

14

70

Doctorate

2

10

Other

1

5

North East

3

15

North Central

6

30

West

4

20

South

7

35

17

85

0

0

2

10

1

5

1988-1993

6

30

1983-1987

4

20

1978-1982

5

25

1973 - 1977

3

15

1972 or before

2

10

Master's + 30

Region

Primary Role
School Psychologist
Administrator
University

JSu pervisor

Trainer

Other

Yearof TerminalDegree

19

Results of Study I revealed that all respondents used base-rate information
accurately when no other information was presented (M

= O, .sJ2= 0).

That is, there

was no difference between the reported and the optimal probability judgment for any of
these respondents. The mean confidence rating was 2.7 (SQ= 1.7).
Analysis 11
Of the 300 surveys mailed for Study 11,106 were returned, yielding an initial
return rate of 35%.

Remailings were sent to the 194 nonresponders; 28 were returned

yielding a remailing response rate of 14%. This procedure resulted in a total of 134
surveys, or a response rate of 45%. The number of surveys in each group ranged from
20 through 27. Surveys were deleted randomly in order to obtain 20 surveys per

group.
Of the 120 surveys used for Study 11,114 respondents provided information
regarding highest degree obtained. Of these, 11% held master's degrees, 52% held
master's degrees plus 30 additional graduate semester hours of credit, 28% held
doctoral degrees, and 5% held other graduate degrees. The median year in which
respondents received their terminal degree was 1980 (range = 1952 through 1993).
Most of the respondents (80%) were employed as school psychologists, but 6% indicated
that their primary role was an administrator or supervisor, 7% a university trainer,
and 7% another role. Of the 120 surveys used, 23% were from northeastern, 27%
from north-central, 26% from western, and 24% from southern parts of the United
States. The sample characteristics for Study II are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2
Sample Characteristics tor Study

II

n

%

Master's

13

11

Master's + 30

47

41

Doctorate

48

42

6

5

North East

28

23

North Central

32

27

West

31

26

South

29

24

91

80

Adm in istrato r/Supe rviso r

7

6

University

8

7

8

7

1988 - 1993

26

24

1983-1987

17

15

1978-1982

21

19

1973-1977

25

23

1972 or before

21

19

Characteristic
EducatiQ □ al Level

Other
RegiQ□

Primary BQle
School Psychologist

Trainer

Other
Year Qf Terminal Qegree

A three (BR + AR; BR + IC; BR + AR + IC) by two (salient link; no link)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA)was conducted for the two dependent
variables: (a) accuracy and (b) confidence.
for information,

E (4, 226 )

=

Results revealed a significant main effect

6.45, Q. < .001, Wilks' Lambda statistic = .81. Neither

the main effect for salient link, E (2, 113 )

= 1.32,
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Q. > .05, Hotellings generalized T-

Squared statistic

= 2.67, nor the interaction between information and salient link,

however, were significant,

E<

1, Wilks' Lambda statistic = .99.

To investigate further the significant MANOVA main effect for information,
separate univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for each of the
dependent variables. These results showed that both accuracy and confidence contributed
to the MANOVA results. For accuracy, results revealed a significant main effect for
information,

E

(2, 114) = 6.68,

12< .01. Neither the main effect for salience nor the

interaction were significant (12> .30 in both cases). The power associated with salience
for this analysis, however, proved to be inadequate to guard against type-II error (~ =
.85). An eta-squared statistic showed that information accounted for 11% of the
variance in the accuracy rating. The two way ANOVA summary table for accuracy is
0

pre~ented in Table 3.
Table 3
Two-way ANOVA Table for Accuracy

Source

df

E

MS

------------------------------------------------------------Information
Salience
Information by Salience
Error

4989.72

2

2494 .86

340.03

1

340.03

53 .82

2

42553.60

11 4

6.68

26. 91

.002

.91

.34

.07

.93

373.28

Tukey post hoc comparisons for the significant main effect (i.e., information)
revealed that the mean accuracy rating for the BR + IC condition (M

= 25.87) was

significantly lower (i.e., more accurate) than the BR + AR condition (M
.01. The BR + AR + IC condition (M

= 41.52),

Q. <

= 31.85) did not differ from either of the other
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two conditions, Q > .05 in both cases. In other words, [BR + IC] < [BR + AR] ; but [BR+
IC]

=

[BR + AR + IC]; and [BR + AR]

=

[BR + AR + IC].

For confidence, ANOVA results revealed a significant main effect for information,

E

(2, 114)

= 9.02, l2 = .001.

Neither the main effect for salience nor the interaction

were significant (12> .1O in both cases). Again, the power associated with salience for
this analysis proved to be inadequate to guard against type-II error (~ = .71). An etasquared statistic showed that information accounted for 14% of the variance in the
confidence rating. The two-way ANOVA summary table for confidence is presented in
Table 4.
Table 4
Two-way ANOVA Table for Confidence

df

MS

58.07

2

29.03

Salience

7.50

1

Information by Salience

1.40

2

367.00

11 4

Source

Information

Error

E

9.02

.001

7 .50

2.33

.13

.70

.22

.80

3.22

Tukey post hoc comparisons for the significant main effect (i.e., information)
revealed that the mean confidence rating for the BR + IC condition (M = 3.20) was
significantly lower (i.e., less confident) than either the BR + AR (M = 4.70) or the BR
+ AR + IC conditions (M = 4.65), 12< .01 in both cases. The BR+ AR condition did not
differ from the BR + AR + IC condition, 12> .10. In other words, [BR + IC] < [BR + AR]

= [BR

+ AR + IC].
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Analysis

Ill

Next, because the main effect for salience and the interaction between salience
and information were not significant in the two-way MANOVA , the two levels of salience
(i.e., salient link; no link) were collapsed . A one-way MANOVA for four levels of
information (i.e., base-rate information from Study I, BR; and BR + AR, BR + IC, and
BR + AR + IC from Study II) was then conducted for the two dependent variables.
Results revealed a significant
Wilks' Lambda statistic

=

effect for information,

E

(6, 270 )

=

13.78 , Q. < .001,

.59.

To investigate further this significant MANOVA effect, ANOVAs again were
conducted for each of the dependent variables.

Similar to Analysis 11,these results

showed that both accuracy and confidence contributed to the MANO VA results. For
accuracy,

results revealed a significant

effect for information,

E

(3, 136) = 25.07, Q. <

.001. An eta-squared statistic showed that information accounted for 36% of the
variance in the accuracy rating. The one-way ANOVA summary table for accuracy is
presented in Table 5.
Table 5
One-way ANOVA Table for Accuracy

Source

Information

23752.69

Error

4294 7.45

df

MS

E

3

7917.56

25.07

136

315.79

Tukey post hoc comparisons for the significant effect (i.e ., information)

<.001

revealed

that the mean accuracy rating for the base-rate condition (BR) from Study I (M
was significantly
Q. <.01.

= O)

lower (i.e., more accurate) than for any of the other three conditions,

Moreover, the mean accuracy rating for the BR + IC condition (M = 26) was
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significantly lower (i.e., more accurate) than the mean accuracy rating for the BR + AR
condition (M = 42), ll < .01. There was no difference, however, between the BR + AR +
IC condition (M = 32) and the BR + IC or the BR+ AR conditions, ll > .05 in both cases.
In other words, [BR] < [BR + IC] < [BR + AR); but [BR + AR] = [BR + AR + IC]; and
[BR + IC] = [BR + AR + IC]. Table 6 presents the mean probability ratings and the
mean accuracy ratings (i.e., the absolute difference between correct and stated
probability judgment) for each information condition.
Table 6
Mean Probability and Accuracy Ratings for Information Conditions

Information Condition

Accuracy Rating (M)

Probability Rating (M.)

BR

10.00

.00

BR+ IC

34.87

25.87

BR +AR

68.62

41 .52

BR+ AR+ IC

48.70

31 . 85

For confidence, results also revealed a significant effect for information,

E (3,

136) = 10.05, ll < .001. An eta-squared statistic showed that information accounted for
18% of the variance in the confidence rating. The one-way ANOVA summary table for
confidence is presented in Table 7.
Table 7
One-way ANOYA Table torConfidence
Source

Information
Error

ffi

df

MS

95.78

3

31 .92

432.10

136

3 .17

25

E

1 0.05

<.001

Tukey post hoc comparisons for the significant effect (i.e ., information) revealed
that the mean confidence ratings for both the BR (M

= 2.70) and the BR + IC conditions

(M = 3.20) were significantly lower (i.e., less confident) than either the BR + AR (M =

4.70) or the BR + AR + IC (M = 4.65) conditions, g, < .01. There were no significant
differences between either the BR and BR + IC conditions or the BR + AR and BR + AR +
IC conditions, g, > .1O in both cases. In other words, [BR] = [BR + IC] < [BR + AR) =
[BR + AR + IC].
Analysis IV
Finally, an ANOVA for years since terminal degree was conducted across the four
levels of case-scenario information in order to determine if differences in this
dependent variable might account for any of the previous findings.

Results , however,

showed that year since terminal degree was distributed similarly across these four
groups,

E (3, 126) = 2.56, g, > .05.
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Discussion
Based on research conducted with laypeople and professionals alike (e.g., Eddy,
1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Schwartz, Gory, Kassirer, & Essig, 1973), three
major predictions were made. First, it was predicted that school psychologists would
use base-rate information appropriately to make probabilistic diagnostic decisions in
the absence of other clinical information. Second, it was predicted that providing a
salient link between base-rate information and the diagnosis to be predicted would
improve diagnostic accuracy. Finally, it was predicted that when school psychologists
were presented with other clinical information (i.e., illusory-correlation

and

accuracy-rate information) in addition to base rates, a greater degree of error would be
present when both individuating, that is., illusory-correlation (IC), and diagnostic, that
is, accuracy-rate (AR) information were presented together with base-rates (BR),
than when either of these sources of information was presented alone with base rates.
That is, (BR + IC + AR) > (BR + IC) or (BR + AR).

Useof BaseRates
Results of the present investigation supported only the first hypothesis.

Here,

despite relatively low levels of diagnostic confidence, participants did use base-rate
information appropriately in the absence of other clinical information.

This clearly was

shown in the responses of the school psychologists, every one of whom was completely
accurate on the probabilistic diagnostic decision task that was administered (i.e., M
difference between correct vs. stated probability = 0,

.fil2 = 0). This result is consistent

with other research (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Lyon & Slovic, 1976) showing that
when base rates are presented alone, individuals are able to use that information
accurately. Thus, this result generalizes the tendency to use base-rate information
appropriately in the absence of other clinical information to the sample of school
psychologists used in the present study. It shows that the school psychologists
appropriately used these relevant base-rate data when making probabilistic diagnostic
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decisions about a case. Although not surprising, this finding is important because it
demonstrates that when no other clinical information is present, school psychologists
(like most other professionals and lay persons) use base rates accurately.
Salience of Link between Base Rate and Diagnosis
The second hypothesis, stating that school psychologists would be more accurate
in their probabilistic diagnostic decisions when a salient link was provided between the
base-rate information and the category to be predicted, was not supported. Responses of
school psychologists who were provided with a salient link in their case-scenario
information did not differ significantly from those who did not receive a salient link.
Thus, school psychologists were not more accurate in their probabilistic diagnostic
decisions when they had a salient link provided between the base-rate information and
the category to be predicted.
Other research examining salience as a potential intervention to remediate or
correct the base-rate fallacy, has yielded equivocal results. Some research has
documented that providing a salient link between the base-rate information and the
category to be predicted enhances the relevance of the base rates and thereby improves
accuracy (Bar-Hillel, 1980), whereas other atte_mpts to improve accuracy by
manipulating salience have proven to be unsuccessful (Lyon & Slovic, 1976). Because
the power associated with this analysis was insufficient to guard adequately against
type-II errors (i.e.,

~

= .85), and because of the limited research conducted on salience

especially within school psychology, salience currently should not be ruled out as a
potential avenue for reducing the base-rate fallacy. Perhaps, a potentially more
powerful link between the base-rate information and the category to be predicted may
help to improve the perceived relevance of base-rate information and thereby increase
diagnostic accuracy. This issue, of course, requires further empirical assessment.
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Base-rate, lodividuatjna, and Diagnostic Information
The third hypothesis, concerning differential levels of accuracy associated with
combinations of base-rate, illusory-correlation

(or individuating), and accuracy-rate

(or diagnostic) information, was not supported. In contrast to what was predicted,
psychologists who received both irrelevant illusory-correlation information as well as
relevant accuracy-rate information with base rates were not the least accurate. Instead,
their responses did not differ significantly from those who received either the relevant
accuracy-rate information with base rates or those who received the irrelevant
illusory-correlation information with base rates.

Moreover, contrary to what might be

expected, participants who received the irrelevant illusory-correlation

information

with base rates were more accurate than .those who received the relevant accuracy-rate
information with base rates.
This third hypothesis was based on previous research conducted in school
psychology and cognitive psychology that has documented the effects of illusorycorrelation and accuracy-rate information on probabilistic decision making.
Specifically, research in the field of school psychology (Gnys et al., in press) has
revealed that school psychologists' diagnostic decisions are influenced adversely by an
illusory belief in an association between particular psychometric results and the
diagnosis of a learning disability.

Further, research in cognitive psychology (Lyon &

Slovic, 1976) has documented that individuals often rely on the accuracy rate of a test
and fail to incorporate other relevant information (e.g., base rates) when making
probability judgments. Research has not examined how these two sources of
information, when combined, affect diagnostic decision-making. It seemed reasonable,
however, to speculate that diagnostic decision-making errors associated with both of
these sources of information combined (i.e., both irrelevant illusory-correlation
information and relevant accuracy-rate information) would be potentiated (or
compounded) over those associated with either source of information alone. Thus,
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probabilistic diagnostic decisions for situations involving base-rate , illusorycorrelation, and accuracy-rate information were predicted to be less accurate than for
situations involving either (a) base-rate and illusory-correlation

information or (b)

base-rate and accuracy-rate information .

Possibleexplanations.
As noted, however, this hypothesis was not supported in
the present study. Moreover, the amount of error associated with adding relevant
accuracy-rate information to base rates exceeded the amount of error associated with
adding irrelevant illusory-correlation information to base rates.

Results of a post-hoc

analysis between information presented and year of terminal degree revealed that there
were no significant differences according to this variable. Thus , year of terminal degree
did not provide an explanation of the differential accuracy among the kinds of
information presented. There are, however, several possible explanations for these
differential levels of accuracy, including, but not limited to: (a) the extremity of the
accuracy-rate information provided, (b) the substantative nature of the illusorycorrelation information provided, and (c) the assumption of additive effects of error
associated with these two sources of information.
The extremity of the accuracy-rate information (i.e., 80%) may provide one
explanation for the differential levels of accuracy. For example, research has
documented that when individuals are presented with accuracy-rate information, they
often base their decisions on that information and neglect other pertinent information.
Lyon and Slovic (1976) suggested that probability estimates often are determined by the
most salient features of case-specific evidence. In this investigation, the stated
accuracy-rate information may have been particularly salient given its extreme nature,
that is, the procedure was described as one that is accurate in identifying the disorder as
present 80% of the time, and inaccurate in identifying the disorder as present 20% of
the time. Thus, participants may have made diagnostic decisions primarily on the basis
of accuracy rate, thereby increasing error . Unfortunately, the design of this
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investigation did not permit an examination of the sources of information upon which
participants relied in order to make their diagnostic decisions. Thus, an evaluation of
this possibility awaits empirical verification.
The substantive nature of the illusory correlation may also provide an
explanation of why school psychologists were more accurate when presented with baserate and illusory-correlation information than with base-rate and accuracy -rate
information.

In the illusory-correlation conditions, participants were given the results

of the WISC-R and were asked to make a probability judgment about the diagnosis of a
learning disability.

Contemporary definitions of learning disabilit ies rely on academic-

achievement information (Hammill, 1990; Hooper & Willis, 1989), and the
psychoeducational assessment of learning disabilities typically includes the
administration of both aptitude and achievement tests. Because academic-achievement
information was not included with aptitude information in these conditions , participants
may have perceived that an essential source of diagnostic information was missing,
thereby becoming more conservative (and, therefore, more accurate) in their
probability estimates than participants in the base-rate and accuracy-rate conditions.
Finally, the assumption of additive effects of error associated with these two
sources of information (i.e. , accuracy-rate and illusory -correlation information) may
have been incorrect. Instead, results of this study suggest that these two sources of
information, when combined with base-rates, did not influence probabiiity judgments in
a solely additive fashion. Compounding or potentiating error would occur if these
sources of information were independent, but error associated with one source of
information also could offset error that is inversely correlated another source of
information. Again, however, the design of this investigation did not permit an
examination of this issue, because diagnostic-information conditions (e.g., BR + IC; BR
+ AR) were treated as a between-groups rather than as a within-subjects variable .
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The base-rate fallacy. Because salience of the link between base-rate and
diagnosis did not affect the accuracy of probabilistic diagnostic decision-making of the
school psychologists, the two levels of this variable (i.e., salient link present vs. salient
link absent) were collapsed, thereby permitting a four-way comparison among levels of
diagnostic information.

Here, in Analysis 111,responses from Study I (involving only

base-rate information) were compared with responses from Study II (involving BR +
AR, BR + IC, and BR + AR + IC information). Results of this comparison revealed that
participants who received base-rate information only were more accurate than all other
participants.

This finding is particularly important because it documented that when

school psychologists were presented with base-rate information in combination with
either irrelevant information, diagnostic information, or irrelevant and diagnostic
information, as compared to base rates alone, their diagnostic accuracy decreased. This .
investigation, therefore, generalizes the base-rate fallacy to the present sample of
school psychologists (Ajzen, 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1980; Lyon & Slovic, 1976 ; Nisbett &
Borgida, 1975), and is perhaps the first study to demonstrate empirically that school
psychologists are likely to neglect, or to underutilize , base rates in probabilistic
decision tasks when either individuating information or diagnostic information is
present.
Diagnostic Confidence
Results also revealed that participants presented with base-rate information
only and those presented with base-rate and illusory-correlation information were less
confident in their diagnostic judgments than those presented with base-rate and
accuracy-rate information or with base-rate information combined with accuracy-rate
and illusory-correlation information.

There was no difference in confidence between

participants who received base-rate information and those who received base-rate and
illusory-correlation

information.

Similarly, there was no difference in confidence

between participants who received base-rate and accuracy-rate information and those
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who received base-rate information combined with accuracy-rate and illusorycorrelation information. That is, [BR]

= [BR

+ IC] < [BR + AR]

= [BR

+ AR + IC].

These results are consistent with other research that demonstrates that
individuals who have considerable confidence in their decisions often make errors
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Fischoff, 1977, 1982).

Indeed, in this investigation, the

most accurate school psychologists (i.e., base-rate only information) were less
confident in their probabilistic diagnostic decisions than all groups but one (i.e., the
base-rate plus illusory-correlation

information group).

Similarly, the participants

who received illusory-correlation information reported lower confidence levels than the
less accurate participants who received accuracy-rate information. These results
suggest limited insight, in the sense that subjective levels of confidence did not match
objective measures of accuracy for the present sample of school psychologists (cf.,
Fisch, Hammond, Joyce, & O'Reilly, 1981; Gauron & Dickinson, 1966).
Conclusions
Results of this investigation generalized the base-rate fallacy to the field of
school psychology. School psychologists were able to use base-rate information
accurately in the absence of other clinical information. Their accuracy, however,
decreased when presented with additional information, either irrelevant or diagnostic.
This finding is consistent with other research examining base rates, and highlights the
need to develop interventions to address the neglect of base-rate information for
diagnostic decision making.
The intervention designed to reduce the error in school psychologists probability
judgments by increasing the salience of the base-rate information was not effective. The
power of this analysis, however, was insufficient and therefore this variable requires
addditional empirical evaluation.
Contrary to prediction, results also documented that combining irrelevant
individuating and relevant diagnostic information did not generate the greatest amount of
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error in school psychologists' probability judgments.

This result suggests that error,

in fact, was not compounded, and raises questions about how different kinds of
information are aggregated in probabilistic diagnostic decision-making tasks.
Finally, results documented that the more confident school psychologists were not
the most accurate. Thus, the higher confidence of some of the participants in this study
was unwarranted based on their accuracy. This result suggests limited insight about
diagnostic decision processes.

Implications.It has been demonstrated that the neglect or underutilization of
base rates can lead to serious diagnostic decision-making errors. Meehl and Rosen
(1955) warned psychologists against evaluating tests by their accuracy rate alone; and,
instead, emphasized the importance of a decision-making framework that incorporates
base rates, costs of error, goals, and other pertinent information.
The findings of this investigation, combined with other decision-making research
in school psychology (Aspel, 1992; Gnys et al., in press; Kennedy, Faust, Willis, &
Piotrowski, in press) raise concerns about the diagnostic strategies of school
psychologists. It appears that school psychologists are prone to some of the same
decision-making errors (e.g., illusory correlation, lack of awareness, the base-rate
fallacy) that have been documented in other fields (see Eddy, 1982; Schwartz et al.,
1973).
Given that diagnosis is a probabilistic task, these results highlight the need for
efforts to improve diagnostic accuracy by eliminating the base-rate fallacy. Clearly,
school psychologists demonstrated that they use base rates when that information was
presented in isolation. Unfortunately, in a more typical diagnostic decision-making task
much more information usually is presented. Base rates typically are not presented
alone and even may be obfuscated by poorly operationalized or poorly validated diagnostic
criteria.

Moreover, in many judgment tasks there is more non-predictive than

predictive information. Sometimes information about the base rate of a diagnosis is
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unavailable to a clinician. In some cases, national base-rate information may be
available, but information about base rates specific to the sample in question may be
lacking. Despite its importance to diagnostic decision making, however, Faust and
Nurcombe (1989) noted that little effort seems to have been directed towards collecting
base-rate information.
Of course, individual clinicians can make base-rate estimates based on
representative samples of cases, but this requires that they first be aware of the
importance of base-rate information for diagnostic accuracy.

Unfortunately, results of

this study suggest that school psychologists have limited awareness of the importance of
base-rate information for diagnostic accuracy. Other research that has attempted to
improve accuracy by identifying problematic judgment strategies and warning
diagnosticians to avoid them have proven unsuccessful (Arkes, 1981; Kurtz & Garfield,
1978), perhaps because awareness of a problematic decision-making strategy
inevitably does not address the cognitive processes that underlie that strategy (Faust &
Nu rcombe, 1989).
Additional research is needed to explore potential avenues for improving the use
of base-rate information in the presence of other clinical information. Results of this
study present potential implications for trainers as well as practitioners.

It has been

suggested that one reason base rates may be neglected is because humans rely on
heuristics to reduce the complexity of many cognitive tasks. Perhaps, providing
alternative heuristics for probabilistic decision-making will enhance the use of baserates. Faust and Nurcombe (1989) suggested several strategies to guide clinical
decision making based in part on principles of probabilistic reasoning. Of course, much
research is needed to see whether teaching these strategies will improve probabilistic
decision making.
In conclusion, research in the area of probabilistic diagnostic making has
revealed numerous problematic judgment strategies. There is now a growing body of
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research showing that the suboptimal reasoning strategies demonstrated in medicine,
psychiatry, and clinical psychiatry also apply to the field of school psychology. This
investigation generalized one of these judgment errors, that is, the base-rate fallacy, to
diagnostic decisions made by school psychologists. Future research will need to begin to
focus on corrective procedures and interventions to reduce diagnostic decision-making
error.
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AppendixA
Diagnostic

Decision Making in School Psychology

We are asking the part icipation of professionals involved in school
psychology to help us in an investigation of diagnost ic decisions . Our
aim is to improve our und.erstanding of school psychologists' diagnostic
decisions.
We believe your participation can make an important
contr ibut ion to research in school psychology.
We would greatly appreciate you taking a few minutes to review the
case on the next page and to respond to a few items. Data will be
analyzed on a group basis . We do guarantee-anonymity
and wish to
assure you that the code number that appears on the page will be used
only to avoid duplicate mailings . A return envelope is enclosed for your
convenience . If you are interested, we would be happy to send you a
mailing indicating when and where any publications stemming from
this work will appear . Just send us a note indicating your interest
under separate cover (to ensure anonymity) .
Thanks for considering

this request.
Sincerely,

'.{ h~✓~-

w. Grant Willis, PhD,
Associate
Professor
University of Rhode Island

o/tlvf

~,?~

~~--~

Mary L/nne Kennedy, MA
Graduate Student
University of Rhode Island
PART

I.

Professional/Practice

Characteristics:

1 . Highest Degree (check one):

· BA

__

EdS

__

MA, MS , MEd

__

EdD, PhD , PsyD ·

___

Masters

__

other

+30

2. Year of degree :__
3. Gender (circle) :

(specify) :____

_
Male

Female

4 . State in wh ich yo u are employed :_______

_

5 . Primary Role :

Schoo l psycho logi st
Ad m in i stra to r/ S uoerv is o r
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__

_ Univers ity
O t he r

Tra iner

ls n P.r i fv\ ·

_

Appendix B

Part

II.

Diagnostic

Decision

Please read the case d.escribed

Making:

below and answer the proceeding

questions.

(1) A total of 10% of the boys in John Smith's school have ·a learning
disability .

1.) Please indicate

the probability

that John Smith has a learning

disability

on a scale from 0% (lowest -- not probable at all) to 100%

(highest

-- certain):

There is a __

% that this child is learning disabled.

2.) Please rate your confidence in your decision on a scale of 1 (not at all
confident)

to 7 (very confident):

Very Confident

Not At All Confident

2
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3

4

5

6

7

AppendixC
Part

II. Diagnostic

Decision

Making:

Please read the case described below and answer the proceeding
questions .

(1) A procedure is used to diagnose learning disabilities.
(2) Because of an effective early intervention

program in John

Smith's school, the incidence of learning disabilities

among boys

in this schoo! is only 10% .
(3) John Sm ith has been tested and results are positive for a
learning

disability .

(4) Part of the procedure
involves

administering

for diagnosing

learning disabilit ies

an intelligence

test.

John Smith's WISC-R (Wechsler Intelligence
Revised)

Below you will find
Scale tor Children--

results .
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1.) Please indicate the probability that John Smith has a learn ing
disability on a scale from 0% (lowest -- not probable at all) to 100%
(highest

There

2 .) Please

-- certain):

is

;:i. ___

% ttiat this child is learning disabled.

rate your confide nce in your decision

all confident ) t o 7 (very

conf iden t):
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0:1

a scale

of 1 (not at

Part

II.

Diagnostic

Decision

Please read the case described

Making:

below and answer the proceeding

questions .

(1) A procedure

is used to diagnose

(2) When the results of the procedure
disability , the procedure
ident ifying learning
procedure
children

is correct

disabled

is wrong

learning

disabilities .

are positive

for a learning

80% of the time in

students

as learning

disabled .

The

20% of the time, that is , it misidentifies

who are not learning disabled

as learning

disabled .

(3) A total of 10% of the boys in John Smith's school have a learning
disab i lity .
(4) John Smith has been tested . and results are positive
learning

disability .

1.) Please indicate

the probability

that John Smith has a learning

disability

on a scale from 0% (lowest -- not probable

(highest

-- certain) :

There is a __

at all) to 100%

% that this child is learning disabled.

2 .) Please rate your confidence
all confident)

for a

in your decis ion on a scale of 1 (not at

to 7 (very confident) :

Not At All Confident

Very Confident

2

3
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5

6
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Part II. Diagnostic

Decision

Making:

Please read the case described below and answer the proceeding
questions.

(1) A pro.cedure is used to diagnose learning disabilities .
(2) A total of 10% of the boys in John Smith's school have a learn ing
disability.
(3) John Smith has been tested and results are positive for a
learning

disability .

(4) Part of the procedure
involves administering

tor diagnosing

learning disabilities

an intelligence

test.

John Smith's WISC-A (Wechsler
-Revised)
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1.) Please indicate the probability that John Smith has a learning
disability on a scale from 0% (lowest -- not probable at all) to 100%
(highest

-- certain):

There is a __

% that this child is learning· disabled .

2 ) Please rate your confidence in your dec ision on a scale of 1 (not at
all confident ) to 7 (very confident) :
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Part II. Diagnostic Decision Making:
Please read the case described below and answer the proceeding
questions .
(1) A procedure is used to diagnose learning disabilities.
(2) When the results· of the procedure are positive for a learning
disability, the procedure is correct 80% of the time in
identifying learning disabled students as learning disabled . The
procedure is wrong 20% of the time, that is , it misident ifies
children who are not learning disabled as learning disabled.
(3) A total of 10% of the boys in John Smith's school have a learning
disability .
(4) John Smith has been tested and results are positive for a
learning disability .
(5) Part of the procedure for diagnosing learning disabilit ies
involves administering an intelligence test.
Below you will find
John Smith's WISC-A (Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Child ren-Revised)

results.
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1.) Please indicate the probability that John Smith has a learning
disability on a scale from 0% (lowest -- not probable at all) to 100%
(hig hest
certa in):
There is a __

% that this ch ild is learn ing disabled .

2.) Please rate your con fidence in your decis ion on a scale of
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Part

II. Diagnostic

Decision

Making:

Please read the case described below and answer the proceeding
questions .

(1) A procedure is used to diagnose learning disabilities .
(2) When the results of the procedure are positive for a learning
disability,

the procedure i:; correct 80% cf the time in

identifying

learning disabled students as learning disabled .

The

procedure

is wrong 20% of the time, that is , it misidentif ies

children who are not learning disabled as learning disabled .
(3) Because of an effective early intervention

program in John

Smith's school, the incidence of learning disabilities

among boys

in this school is only 10%.
(5) .John has been tested and results are positive for a learning
disability

.

1.) Please indicate the probability that John Smith has a learning
disa!Jility on a sca!e from 0~1= (lowest -- not probable at a!I) tc 100%
(highest

-- certain) :

There is a __

% that th is child is learning disabled .

2.) Please rate your confidence in your dec ision on a scale of 1 (not at
all conf ident) to 7 (very conf ident) :

Not At All Confident .

Very Confident

2

4

3
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Part II. Diagnostic Decision Making:
Please read the case described below and answer the proceeding
questions .
(1) A procedure is used to diagnose learning disabilities .
(2) When the results of the procedure are positive for a learning
disability, the procedure is correct 80% of the time in
identifying learning disabled students as learning disabled.
The
procedure is wrong 20% of the time, that is, it misidentifies
children who are not learning disabled as learning disabled .
(3) Because of an effective early intervention program in John
Smith's school, the incidence of learning disabilities among boys
in this school is only 10%.
(4) John Smith has been tested and results are positive for a
learning disability.
(5) Part of the procedure for diagnosing learning disabilities
involves administering an intelligence test.
Below you will find
John Smith's WISC-A (Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children-Revised) results .
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1.) Please indicate the probability that John Smith has a learning
disability on a scale from 0% (lowest -- not probable at all) to 100%
(h ighest
certain):
There is a ___

% that this ch ild is learn ing d isabled .

2.) Please rate your confide nce in your decision on a scale of 1 (not at
all confident) to 7 (very con fident) :
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